

The Dialectical Model:
Philosophical, Metapsychological and Clinical Implications.

Despite the increased sophistication of current introspective endeavors, such as psychoanalysis with its 80 years of consistent investigation of psychic structures, two fundamental philosophical questions remain unanswered: How do we know, and what is the nature of our being? The lack of resolution of these two questions raises derivative problems that plague all subjective sciences, which do not have the same truth or proof criteria as the hard sciences of physics, biology, or mathematics (a different kind of subjective science). If the system and solutions offered are not intrinsically convincing, like an elegant mathematical proof, the entire explanatory system, resting on doubtful assumptions or inferences, lies open to devastating criticism. Unfortunately, there are no introspection-based systems that are inherently convincing and still powerful enough to have great explanatory value. In clinical psychology and religion, often the best we can hope for is the choice between plausible alternatives.

From the epistemological perspective, understanding knowing itself is all important. Unless we know the parameters of knowing irrefutably, nothing we know has certainty. Philosophers of science have discussed the attributes of "good" scientific theory versus popular or successful theory, especially in the hard sciences. In the real world far less stringent criteria determine the success of popular theory in economics, politics, business and religion.

Many successful social, political and economic theories explain phenomena without having internal consistency or without having a wide range of explanatory power, these being two absolutely minimal ingredients for "good" mathematical

theory. Sometimes their only truth lies in catch-22 tautologous definitions. Sometimes these theories are convenient fictions that protect people from seeing their inadequacies or unimportance--they serve narcissitic needs.

Other theories may have enormous explanatory power and internal consistency yet are unpopular because they shift too far from current perspectives or are not understandable because of complexity or terminology. It happens in physics, medicine and even more so in the subjective disciplines where they more easily undermine fundamental beliefs and views that are parts of our selves. Belief systems fall squarely in the middle of our self representations. Physical speculation challenges our sense of self less because the subject matter is less personal. Still, a Copernicus can suffer public abuse when his heliocentric theory punctured the medieval grandiosity of Man's centrality in the universe.

Even the "best" theories are only marginally objective. The basis of all objectivity from a cognitive (versus phenomenal) standpoint is logic and derivative mathematical systems. Mathematical proof, which underlies all physical theory, falls into types (e.g., intuitionist or constructivist, logicist), matching differing personality styles. Constructivists wouldn't accept all the proofs or assumptions of an intuitionist and conversely. Physical theory not only has to worry about acceptable inference within its framework but also what constitutes verification of the theory, adding a dimensional difficulty beyond mathematical proof. Physical "truth" matures from decade to decade and sometimes changes abruptly, so that what was truth becomes fairy tale. Physical, economic, social, philosophical and religious theories come and go. Sometimes they can "stand on each other's shoulders" building progressively more powerful theory, and sometimes they are merely supplanted by the political problem of the year with no additive understanding through time.

All theories are subjective in their 1). origin, partially in their 2). proof, and in their 3). acceptability. Like relativity, they originate out of a 13 year old Einstein's preoccupation with light velocity and bending of rays, or Freud's self-analysis and difficulties with his father. Their inner structure and proof rests on uncertain premises and inferences. They can become publically objective for a brief historical moment through universal acceptance within select populations of laymen or scientists. But soon this former paradigm becomes supplanted and lapses into a status of quaint but outdated notions. New Einstein's with new personal struggles invent new paradigms. If his new solution falls within the spectrum of current acceptability, the theory has a fighting chance to become popular within its sphere. Today popularity often means funding and funding aids success. But the perennial problems of philosophy remain unchanged, lying at the core of a continually differentiating self. Philosophy addresses them directly, academic psychology looks for measurable parameters of being and knowing, clinical psychology looks for therapeutic implications and religion offers meaning frameworks that appeal directly to subjective needs.

My fundamental purpose in this book is to propose one possible meeting of spirituality and psychology in a single science of subjectivity. Subjectivity is a poorly understood area and needs articulation far better than it has been afforded. At the level of self investigated in this book, distinctions between subjectivity and objectivity become quite blurred, merged in the basic processes of knowing and being themselves. This lack of clarity further prevents a high level of certainty. I have borrowed tools and metaphysics from both East and West, and have given that amalgam a Western orientation and a peculiarly individual emphasis by finding "spirituality" and the highest forms of religious experience in interpersonal relations--in the I-Thou interaction.

Spirituality, for me, lies within the range of experiences of self differentiating out from undifferentiated experience into autonomous separateness, and then to "meet" the other in communion. In a broad perspective this viewpoint has many precursors: Buber, Krishnamurti, Jung, Becker and even Nietzsche.

This perspective downplays transcendent elements of God, Big self, collective unconsciousness and the like, and emphasizes spiritual experience as residing in the personal and interpersonal. "Spiritual" does not flow from giving the personal a transcendent meaning as in some interpretations. In these systems personal experience is spiritual if it manifests God or universal mind learning to know itself through individual consciousnesses (Muktananda, Jung, Shankarananda, Hegel). I am proposing that individuation and communion are the origin of experiences that most people call spiritual; the quality of certain of these experiences lead people to interpret them to be intimations of the transcendent. For some, these experiences cannot or should not be explained in mundane terms of everyday life. Explaining that experience's sublime beauty as flowing from any mortal relationship or arising from the personal self would be to defame and poison the saving hope of the transcendent. If the deepest experiences of man come from personal communion and not from an immortal universal, then death is not avoided. (See chapter four and its appendix for discussions of varieties of religious and their meanings).

Belief in the transcendent to provide salvation or evolutionary purpose and hope, and the denigration of personal level relationships are especially prevailing in Eastern religions. To some degree most religions find fault with the pain and temporary nature of personal relationships and the personal self, claiming higher, happier, more evolved states exist if only Jesus is accepted, Baba is followed or I become so autonomous through transpersonal evolution that I don't need relationships.

I am proposing this personal origination theory of religious experience as part of a metapsychology of the personal self, its object relations and consciousness underpinnings. Such a proposal is open to the same criticisms as Freud's metapsychology, of being metaphorical, simplistic and not explaining observations any better than a dozen other theories. This is true. But this theory does have saving attributes. First, it has a humanizing influence of looking for the transcendent in one's experience of another person. "God" is in everyday interpersonal relationships. Secondly, if the I-Thou spectrum of experience is the origin of what most people consider spiritual and motivates their seeking for repetition of those experiences, then an interpersonal spirituality/psychology has a higher chance of generating "spiritual" states than isolated practices such as meditation, chanting or even prayer.

The theory also has a measure of supporting clinical evidence, especially the little understood observation of the dialectical nature of the therapy process. Although the case history is usually not considered proof outside of psychoanalysis, I have included several clinical examples to give substance to aspects of the theory. While not yet fully developed, it also integrates observations and inferences of self structures with object relations theory and developmental psychology, leading to the foundation of a new discipline of phenomenological psychoanalysis. As James Grotstein once said, "'object relations'" is a misnomer, a far better term is 'subject relations.'" This theory squarely places emphasis on the subjective aspects of self experience versus the representational or objective. Further, it incorporates an understanding of altered consciousness states of religion and everyday experience into a general explanatory framework of the self and consciousness. Lastly, it has therapeutic implications in terms of stages of therapy, understanding the observed dialectical quality of the therapy

process, and providing techniques to assist psychodynamic therapists.

Even if this theory were much better than it is and offered an absolute resolution of a hundred clinical problems, it would meet a great deal of resistance if only because of its emphasis on the personal in religion and the subjective in psychology: Transcendental beliefs provide a specialness for some who otherwise would feel very bad about themselves. Being associated with God or an evolutionary collective consciousness provides a wider perspective to avoid personal pain and reach a specialness of divine respectability. These beliefs also give meaning to depressed or narcissistic people who feel their lives meaningless or empty. It gives direction and purpose. In The Enlightenment Maneuver I enumerate the psychological defenses of traditional religions and spiritual practices. These defensive aspects of spirituality ensure the continued acceptability of the transcendental for a long, long time. They also insure that any theory stating that religious experience flows from the finite and personal will encounter strong opposition, often expressed as "objective" criticisms attacking the subjective origins or reductionist quality of the idea.

There is something about the explicit presentation of subjectivity and attempting to objectify and understand it that is threatening, not only in religion and politics, but in everyday life. The child is squelched in her presentation of self because parents are unable to cope with her needs and feel guilty, or are embarrassed by her public displays. She grows up to distrust her own subjectivity and to look for other people's subjectivities given a garb of objectivity or "proof." This protects her from the capriciousness of cruel or denigrating parental authority, and from doubt in her own subjectivity. When she finally attains her own understanding, which is part of her representational subjectivity, which are mostly internalizations of other's belief systems, she will

fight to hold onto it much like a two year old's opposition to "unfair," demanding and invasive parents.

In this book I do not deny the transcendental, God or objectivity. I do oppose a focused emphasis on them as being the only "true" religion or the only basis for psychology. Rather than deny anyone's subjectivity, I am urging everyone to look deeper into their subjectivity, underneath the representational and belief systems to the most basic level of I-ness and self. I am changing an emphasis, not denying traditional alternatives.

A large amount of this book is written in the first person. It is my experience based on many years of spiritual practice and search, and many years of doing therapy with other people engaged in the same endeavor. I cannot hope to convince those who hold different views to change by offering a preponderance of evidence or a literature search. That would require a different sort of personality than mine, one that is a scientist in the classical sense or an academician creating connections within a traditional body of evidence. This book is experiential in origin and expression and its arguments are directed towards elucidating your intuition rather than meeting objective or logical truth criteria. It's primary function is to help you articulate aspects of your own subjectivity, either by accepting differentiations found here or by opposing them.

THE THEORY

Knowing I won't resolve them to any satisfying degree, I'd like to address the two philosophical questions: How do we know? and, What am I? In the last chapter I presented the idea that self (what am I?) had several aspects, and that consciousness also had at least two aspects of merger and witness. In this chapter I want to explicitly add that personality is a "structure" of consciousness which "overlies"

consciousness itself. By structure, I mean perceptual, cognitive and control processes, functions which become semipermanent "Gestalten" that interpenetrate consciousness in its dual attributes and then determine the level, focusing and directing of consciousness. These structures also result in the differentiation of perceptual and imaginal fields into various encapsulated and bounded realities, such as "inner" and "outer" worlds, each of which has own specific contents or "objects" (images in the inner world, "real" trees and people in the "outer" world).

After perceptual and conceptual realities have been formed in the infant, each with its own subject matter and content, we can find "linkages" of meaning and association that hold these realms together from the inside and also linkages that connect elements between different realities. For example, my idea of my wife which "exists" in my subjective experience, has a certain permanence over time and a degree of stability and coherence. Her representation changes only slowly and is embedded in my system of external world representations, belief systems, expectation patterns and habits. Her representation also has some relation to my wife as a real, external person. Representational reality mirrors the external reality.

The same kind of inner connections that hold her image together and relate it to all my other representations give a "felt sense" of unity and security to many people, but also an illusion these internal linkages are "real," external, physical forces that connect physical and mental entities. Inner meaning and associational connections are projected and externalized, leading to experiences of apparent unities in the external world that are reflections of our internal connections and an apparent transcendent spirituality. In this and the next chapter, I hope to bring these ideas together in a convincing fashion towards the end of answering the metaphysical questions and also provide a clinical framework for a phenomenological psychoanalysis.

To simplify discussion, I'd like to relax the level of differentiation of self we are concerned with compared to the microanalytic analysis of the last chapter and examine the development of the entire self, both in the infant and in therapy. We begin this investigation by examining the structure building processes of objectification.

"Objectification" is the process whereby that which was formerly self becomes an object that self can now examine. Experience that once was "I," becomes an "it." Rather than "just" understanding objectification as an abstract concept from which we can deduce results, I want to be able to closely perceive this process as it subjectively occurs, without any preconceptions as to what is happening, so that we can literally see, hear and feel the most minute detail by which former self-experience becomes something witnessed within the perceptual fields. I want to witness and understand how the process of objectification itself takes place, a process which on the microanalytic level is still a subjective phenomena.

ORIGIN OF THE SELF

Heinz Hartmann suggested 35 years ago that the infant begins life living in an "undifferentiated experiential matrix" where all experience is thrown together without meaning or division into inner or outer, body or not body, self or not-self experience. Let us assume the infant's subjectivity is embedded in this undifferentiated matrix. Let's suppose further that the interaction of the infant with her mother and with the environment begins a progressive objectification of portions of that matrix into a not-self (subjective or private not-self and objective or public not-self) and into specific others (mother). This objectification must cover the entire experiential field and in the case of objectifying the mother, involves a differentiation across all the sensual fields of taste, touch, smell, sight

and sound, to form a single, external object. Mother becomes specific external sounds (heartbeat and voice), sight, touch and smell.

At the same time she is separating out the kinesthetic sense as belonging to her own body, she is also pulling certain emotional elements into her own side of the inner-outer barrier which soon will become an initial boundary between self and not-self. This emotional differentiation occurs as feelings of love, hate, dependence, envy and rage become fixed around that external physical object-mother which itself is being differentiated out from the self and from other perceived objects within external visual, auditory and tactile fields. The totality of "not-self" which is separating from self and self precursors (such as inner-outer distinctions), is itself differentiating into objects. Some objects are physical and inert, others are people, one of which will become mother.

This specific object, now the focus or "object" of emotion as well as a separate entity within the visual-auditory and other sensual fields, begins to acquire the physical and emotional properties associated with increased cognitive abilities and emotional sophistication of the infant-child. As the infant's perceptual discriminations and cognitive abilities mature, the perceived attributes of mother and other objects become more sophisticated. The sequence of these differentiations is still not clear, nor whether the emotional bonding and differentiations "cause" perceptual differentiations leading to cognitive and moral structuring, or whether all these differentiations occur simultaneously as part of a neurological evolution.

The external mother becomes a person in her own right as the child begins to develop a separate selfhood. This external person is different from the rest of the child's subjectivity, yet intimately intertwined with it. Initially, the newly differentiated infant self-nucleus is primarily body

awareness, and emotional and physical neediness; the "other" is an external object, a thing that has smell, taste, touch, and which does good things to her or who abandons her. The sensual field begins to acquire a cognitive matrix of learning and meaning overlying the merely sensual. This new matrix of organized experience has a sophistication dependent on age, learning, milieu and the quality of parental interaction.

Elements of both the self and of objects (both inanimate and love objects) begin to acquire stability and wholeness through time and space. Processes, functions and representations become frozen into structure. The self is still primarily a body-self with the locus of consciousness being an immersion in body sensations, impulses and emotions. Gradually self and other are separated by invisible barriers into discrete realms of function, being and meaning. Each experiential realm has its own laws of meaning, association and linking, and entities within these realms (such as core self, self representations and object representations) become stabilized into discrete "Gestalten" or forms which hang together as mysteriously as the process by which the experiential realms are held separate. The external world has its own laws explaining how it works. Our internal worlds each have their own logics and rules of operation, portions of which are dominated by "primary processes" (the unconscious of Freud) and others by secondary and more reality oriented processes. All these worlds have their own internal geometries, logics, contents and objects linked together through meaning and other more tangible ways. Elements within these separate experiential realms also become linked to elements in the other realms through meaning and through other cognitive and emotional processes. External events become related to inner events of feelings, physical ease or distress and causal-operative understanding. As an adult these processes result in object representations that have enough integration and reality to allow me to relate with a real person.

DIFFERENTIATION AS A DIALECTICAL PROGRESSION

In the last chapter I speculated that witnessing is partially responsible for the differentiation of implicit structures within the core self by making them explicit, transforming them into an embedded existence in our representational self. Developmental stresses localize reflexive awareness on certain aspects of the self, the outer world, or in Freud's metapsychology, into various parts of the body. But witnessing alone is not enough. The process of division of the undifferentiated matrix into realms, perceptual fields, objects and interpenetrating connections is not a simple or linear process. Self-structures and boundaries are formed in a complex dialectical process originating from an initial distancing or objectification of self experience. This first objectification (or insight in therapy) is not permanent, it does not "hold." Again the self merges into the experience, followed by another round of objectification and again, re-merger. Many repetitions of objectification and merger are necessary to make the separation permanent, and each dialectical stage adds a little more differentiation to the newly perceived reality or object within that reality.

Robert Kegan (1982) describes this process in exquisite detail and expands the discussion beyond the formation of experiential realms to include complex motor, cognitive and moral development. For the purposes of this book, I am limiting discussion to the very early aspects of the formation of experiential realms.

At first, most everything for the infant is I-ness, it has no specific location. Gradually I-ness becomes limited to a body and emotional self as the infant learns portions of the totality of her existence are her arm and what it can reach, or a mouth and what it can taste or suck. Representational superstructures are linked to the core self forming around the I, that were previously objectified through development or

defense. Those previously conflicted areas and issues became objectified into explicit structures, neutralized of conflict and stress (e.g., the Freudian libidinal stages of oral, anal and genital). Formerly sources of great pleasure, pain and perhaps struggle with mother the old areas grow quiescent while new behaviors, attitudes and developmental struggles emerge. The objectified self is now content that new self has; the three year old can enjoy sucking on a bottle's nipple for gratification, but she has gone beyond orality in general on her way to genital satisfaction (in the Freudian schema). Depending on whether the objectification was developmentally appropriate or defensively motivated, the adaptiveness of the ego has been improved or impoverished. Onto this self-core are added various fantasy-affect-memory-idea-identity linkages, and other developmental line accomplishments and residues, that together form the ego. The ego is the objective entity psychoanalysis is most concerned with consisting not only of self with its object relations, and self-related narcissistic evaluations, but also all the learning, cognitive, perceiving and control mechanisms of mind--the objective skills of a functioning self.

This early era of the infant's development is difficult to conceptualize because there really isn't a differentiation into self and not-self, and we really don't know what is happening inside except by later analyses and observational inference. The restricted sense of I-ness and the birth of the self supposedly doesn't occur until the age of three according to current theory dominated by Mahler's (1975) work. Melanie Klein held that the self was present almost from birth. In either case the undifferentiated matrix begins to fragment according to inherent developmental rules and external factors into experientially discrete areas, one of which is the inner, subjective and mostly body sense. This area will mostly contain the core sense of self and I-ness. These areas are properly called pre-self areas and the boundaries

separating them from not-self areas perhaps should be called precursing self-boundaries.

An intriguing question is whether that early pre-self nexus is an agent in the differentiating process by which it separates out from the matrix, or more a passive observer? Is the pre-self consciously an agent in the construction of its own reality, or does it observe a fixed and objective developmental sequence from the inside? These two cases might present very different descriptions of the developmental process. The next best thing knowing the infant's subjectivity, is to observe the process of re-development of the self in therapy to determine the agency factor of the conscious self there. My intuition is that the self is mostly a passive observer of its own development. Healing and building are only modestly volitional or insight dependent, and mostly occur out of the range of consciousness.

In the infant, interplay of the dual consciousness processes itself creates a progressive structuring dialectic. The differentiating out from the matrix of the self may appear to be a linear progression of maturation, but looked at minutely, we see progression is followed by regression, objectification by merger, discrimination by a return to featurelessness. Yet within this dialectic there are developmental milestones. The self does progressively leave its simpler states behind, though often with fixations caused by insufficient mothering or trauma.

The result of this process of self-articulation, objectification, remerger and reobjectification is that the self that remains is different from the self that was before. The new self has portions of the old self as object. The three year old finds satisfaction in occasional orality, and in control over her elimination processes, but now she is moving in other directions. Orality and anality are still there, but as well explored portions of her psyche. The self has as not-self, or object, all that she had considered "world" or

"other" before and it now also has her former preoccupation with the breast and feces. Her new self is substantively different from her old self just by the fact that it now has portions of itself as content. The self is more differentiated, structured, and the very locus of consciousness has changed to a more sophisticated yet deeper subjectivity. Her locus of consciousness "moves deeper" into her unconscious, undeveloped, implicit structures presaging the next developmental round with its intensification and focusing of consciousness on another aspect of her existence. She no longer "lives" in those portions of her old self now made explicit. She no longer simply reacts and manifests from those parts of herself. They are now part of her agency over which she has some measure of control. She now lives in a new subjectivity which includes the old subjectivity as object.

We can now understand the buried subjective structures in a more complete and articulated way than before. What was subjective, what was the self and determined what and how the self perceived, now becomes objective--itself an experience from a new self, a new locus, of being and consciousness. The self thus evolves in an "spiral" based on a dialectical process of objectification of subjectivity. Before this objectification, the content of our consciousness--the objective--was arranged, differentiated and understood through the mediation of an implicit structure within the self and its way of knowing. Our reality is shaped by what we know, the way we know, and also by the way we are--by the structure of our being which we call the self. This structure is what we are, yet we do not know it.

This lends another meaning to Sasaki Roshi's (1967) directive that a Zen student must acquire a new center of gravity. It applies also to therapeutic clients who are recapitulating arrested developmental sequences. The student (and client) must learn to subjectify his objective self, and objectify his subjective self. The "barrier" between knower

and the known must be permeable enough to allow a movement of the locus of consciousness from objective to subjective and vice-versa. Without permeability, evolutionary differentiations cannot occur.

DIFFERENTIATION OF THE UNDIFFERENTIATED INTO REALMS AND THE REALMS INTO OBJECTS

The perceptual and conceptual worlds or "realms" are the commonplace and not so commonplace ways we adults divide our experience into discrete geometries of experience. Each of those geometries has its own kinds of objects and its own ways of tying them together with perceptual associations or meaning. Some of these realms are: the external world with its meaning, laws of physics and perception (in art and psychology); the inner world of our body experience containing sensations of motion, pain, organ awareness and within which is embedded that most important realm of emotionality with its own logic. Also within the "inner" world is a separate realm of fantasy, which is not public (others cannot see our fantasy although they might be able to empathically understand it). This not-public reality often seems to mix with the external world and not be limited to inside our skins (the locus of our "inner" world). Winnicott calls it the transitional world--a realm where meaning and boundaries are formed by the young child trying to separate his subjective world from the objective, public reality. This transitional reality has its own logic, its own laws of causal or associational sequencing and meaning.

Some of these realms and objects within them have a shared public reality we call ordinary reality which serves as a background constant within which we lead our lives. Ordinary reality consists of shared phenomenology--the sight of a tree, the physical presence of my Toyota Corolla, and universal beliefs we have about those objects and our rela-

tions to them (our Eastern or Western attitudes towards the external world for example). Many people question the assumption that the connections within this reality are "real;" they march to a different drummer. They question the laws of association within a commonly accepted reality and forge new contexts of meaning within them as physicists do in the reality called the physical universe, and object relations theorists in the realm of emotional objects.

Some question deeper, doubting that the reality we live in--the public reality of our time--is truly "real." This large class includes many who write science fiction, many physicists, a few psychologists, and also many mystics and spiritual practitioners who have an intuition of a different reality or self. Sometimes that intuition is no more than a vague promise of something better seized on while reading a religious text. Sometimes they have had glimpses of these realities through spontaneous altered states. For a few, the need to reexperience this reality and understand its the form or meaning becomes an obsession.

Some of these mystics perform practices and take drugs to induce altered consciousness experiences of those realities. They bring back tales of sorcerer's worlds, of enlightenment, Satori, and Moksha. They tell us of ultimate realities of no-self, no-meaning, no-life and no-death. They tell us of heaven and of the Western Paradise. Unfortunately, many psychotics tell us similar tales and to the many of us for which neither altered reality is directly available, there is no way to tell the difference except to judge the source. Many gurus have a warm and cheerful demeanor that charms listeners into accepting the most outrageous tales and views.

But all these realities, including the world of ordinary mind, have their beginning in the very early period where the child begins to differentiate her world into realms and into objects. Everything arises out of that primal subjectivity of the undifferentiated experiential matrix.

THE "INNER," CORE SELF, AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Besides that initial realm of inner and outer (of our skins), we have another realm division between the self and the not-self. As we examined in the last chapter, the self is not just the inner world. Many elements and experiences that belong in to the inner side of experience are not considered self by most people, and self itself has different layers. For example, someone who is experiencing some long term pain, from arthritis or an ulcer most probably does not consider that pain to be part of herself. It is something that is happening to her. This experience is internal to the skin, it is private and not experienced by others. Still she probably does not consider that pain to be essential to her self experience. If that sensation went away, her self-nature would not change. Some process within the developmental objectification of her experience led to a disowning of certain kinds of body sensations so that she became a self only partially identified with her body.

Wilhelm Reich created a body centered therapy based on the assumption that inappropriate objectification of body experience took place to defend the self against emotional trauma, and which led to a self progressively isolated and relegated to a small portion of the body's experience. Objectification, appropriate or inappropriate, results in and from a split in body awareness. Some part of the body experience is considered self, other parts as not-self.¹ Again,

1. In Indian philosophy this partial non-identification of self with body is taken to indicate that "Self" is something divine and which transcends body and mind. The Theravadan Buddhist meditation technique and the philosophical arguments accompanying that technique take this tact one step further by analysing (witnessing) what remains of the body identification (objectifying that subjectivity) and thereby making it (the body identification) disappear. This disappearance of the subjective through meditative analysis is taken to mean that the self sense--"normal mind identification," is illusory, and that "deeper" investigation reveals

consciousness is split, this time into a conscious, subjective body experience called self, and into a conscious, subjective body experience called not-self (and this realm may include body aches or emotions not admitted to be part of the self or the self representation).

Yet if our hypothetical woman were deeply in love and emotionally connected to her lover, she might consider that man to be herself in many ways. She might identify with certain of his characteristics taking them to be herself. She might feel a diminished sense of self, empty or deprived, if he went away (and sometimes if he stayed around). But the man himself is definitely of the external and public world. Others can see and relate to him (or at least the aspect of himself he wants to relate). Portions of her core of self are identified with a portion of her experience which is apparently external, public and "objective," and which is not merely an object representation or idea she has of him. The external has become identified with self; the man outside is brought inside the self. The bond between them connects and subjectifies the objective. A symbiosis is formed and a process begins where the woman regresses to become a little girl with her mommy or daddy.

Besides these phenomenal worlds we also have at least one implied realm: the dynamic unconsciousness. This hypothetical realm is not directly available to perception. It is an inferred reality posited to explain observable phenomena. Part of its function is to act as a repository for buried instinctual needs, thoughts and fantasies, and a buffer to keep these elements out of consciousness. It has its own struc-

that unreality.

This partial identification of the self with the body across cultures probably also means that it is not just a defensive maneuver. There are real developmental necessities for partial non-identification and partial objectification.

ture (subjectivity) which can be brought into consciousness, and its own laws of association (primary process thinking and secondary). It contains instinctual aspects and ideal aspects (superego), with the Id being a storehouse realm of impulsive needs and the superego being a Gestalt or agent partially determining action. There are complex processes by which subjective elements pass into or out of consciousness (ego) from these unconscious areas.

Most therapists would not deny that the unconsciousness exists. Its reality is quickly apparent in therapy with clients. The structure of the unconsciousness is far less obvious. The reality of the dynamic unconsciousness is even less real to the client because it is not part of her conscious subjectivity. It is the unconscious, a subjective (private) not-self realm. Other subjective elements lie within the unconsciousness but are not usually included as part of the dynamic aspects of unconsciousness based on the pleasure principle. Elements such as poorly articulated emotions (from inadequate upbringing) and certain organ sensations, like the heartbeat and liver functioning are out of awareness, but not necessarily defended against.

What is the quality of unconscious experience made conscious, or of poorly differentiated experience made articulate? For example, how is a formerly buried or unarticulated feeling first experienced? Eugene Gendlin calls this getting to the "felt sense" of an emergent feeling or body sensation. In the last chapter I mentioned mode I experience of an emotion, where I experience a feeling with some degree of separation, alienation or witnessing. It often has a "felt sense" of being pushed down or poorly formed and quite fragile. But what is the quality of this felt sense?